In DSS v DST,[1] the Singapore High Court found that an award, where 108 out of the 211 paragraphs were wholesale or substantial reproductions of excerpts from a related award, was not rendered in breach of natural justice. The Claimant said that the reproductions were not limited to reciting of uncontroversial procedural matters but “extend to findings of fact, legal analysis and reasoning on contested issues” (at [28]). The Court found that mere similarities between the awards would not give rise to a reasonable apprehension or suspicion that the arbitral tribunal had prejudged the issues and approached the matter with a closed mind. Whilst highly fact sensitive, DSS v DST tells us (again) that challenges founded on a breach of natural justice require exceptional circumstances.                               

Context

There were two arbitrations between charterparties: the first between the Owner and Head Charterer, the Defendant, and the second between Head Charterer and Sub-charterer, the Claimant. The Owner commenced arbitration against the Defendant (Head Reference) and a sole arbitrator was appointed. The Defendant then commenced arbitration against the Claimant and a three member tribunal was appointed. Both arbitrations had a Singapore Seat and were under the rules of the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration. Based on all parties’ agreement, both arbitrations were heard concurrently with the two tribunals sitting together. Separate awards were issued by each tribunal: the “Head Award” in the Head reference, and “Award” in the Sub-charter arbitration.

The Claimant challenged the Award on the basis that it was in breach of natural justice. Put another way, the Claimant said that similarities between the Head Award and Award amounted to apparent bias because a fair-minded and informed observer of the public would reasonably apprehend or suspect that the tribunal was in fact biased or had a closed mind.

Natural Justice

The challenge focused on three elements of natural justice:

• apparent bias, on the basis the Tribunal had prejudged the issues and approached the Sub-reference with a closed mind (under the “rule against bias”);

• the Tribunal had not properly applied its mind to the matters in the Sub-reference (first aspect of the “fair hearing rule”);

• the Tribunal had decided the matter on a basis not contemplated by the Parties (second aspect of the “fair hearing rule”)

Challenges where related arbitrations included at least one of the parties and are heard by the same tribunal are not uncommon. There, an arbitrator is naturally exposed to more information than he would otherwise receive sitting in a single arbitration. A challenge to an award in such circumstances was successful in DJP v DJO  in Singapore.[2] In that case, three awards had the same presiding arbitrator; in the challenged award, there was copying from the two awards already handed down including paragraphs on submissions not made in the challenged arbitration; and an error in the application of the lex arbitri. This was said to give reasonable suspicion of a closed mind leading to apparent bias; lack of contemplation of the decision-making process; and unequal access to relevant information.[3]

In England, in the context of statutory adjudication, where an adjudicator sitting on two related disputes failed to disclose this, and the common party had used inconsistent factual positions, a challenge to enforcement of the decision was successful.[4] Those circumstances gave rise to what Dyson LJ (as he then was) referred to as “something of substance”,[5] to find a real possibility of a decision-maker having a closed mind. Similarly, Leggatt J (as he then was) decided against the appointment of an arbitrator in a related matter on the ground that there was “a legitimate concern that that person would be influenced in deciding [the second arbitration] by arguments and evidence in [the first arbitration]”.[6]

The Singapore High Court Thinking

The Singapore High Court in DSS v DST did not set aside the Award on the grounds that the Tribunal had pre-judged the Award by reference to the Head Award (or under the related fair-hearing rule). The Court found that the ‘copied’ paragraphs were merely descriptive of factual matters and not “evaluative findings” (at [103]). In circumstances where the arbitrations had been heard together, and there being overlap in the factual and legal issues, the Tribunal’s ‘copying’ of factual paragraphs would not result in an objective observer concluding that there was bias or prejudgment.

Our Thoughts

In the present case, the Court felt that similarities between the two awards did not lead to the inference that a fair-minded and informed observer would find that something material had gone wrong. Instead, the Court highlighted that the Tribunal was itself aware that the similarities between the two awards might give rise to concerns; the similar paragraphs “mostly dealt with undisputed background facts” (at [91]); there was tangible evidential overlap between the two arbitrations, but the Tribunal “was aware of the differences in the arguments raised in the Sub-Reference and tailored its analysis accordingly” ([at 114]), which helped to assuage any concerns of prejudgment. Standing back a little, Courts (whether in Singapore or in other common law jurisdictions) need exceptional facts coupled with material ‘breaches’ in the decision-making process before challenges grounded in natural justice can succeed. Whilst prejudgment by a tribunal is a form of apparent bias, it is clear that a high threshold also applies to it.

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^[1] [2026] SGHC 145.

^[2] [2025] SGCA(I) 2.

^[3] Ibid, at [65].

^[4] Beumer Group UK Ltd v Vinci Construction UK Ltd [2016] EWHC 2283 (TCC).

^[5] Ibid, at [38], quoting Amec v Whitefriars [2004] EWCA Civ 1418, at [21].

^[6] Guidant LLC v Swiss RE International SE, Swiss Re International (UK Branch) [2016] EWHC 1201 (Comm), at [9].